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Broader Issues of Plurilateral FTAs
THE TPP AND THE RCEP (ASEAN+6) AS




Facing the trend of globalization, voices within Asia have been
calling for deeper Asian integration. In the international economic
context, numerous competing visions have been proffered over the
years as to what form that integration should take, and which
country or countries should lead that process. Amongst these
various possible forms of integration, the Trans-Pacific Partnership
has emerged as a contender to expand into a Free Trade Agreement
of the Asia-Pacific. Unlike any models proposed previously, the TPP
includes the United States, but at present does not include China. In
turn, the momentum of the TPP appears to have spurred China to
push more actively for its own multiparty grouping, the ASEAN+6,
currently known as the Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership ("RCEP'). In this article, the author analyzes the
similarities and differences between these two potential paths
towards Asian integration and identifies factors that may influence
each agreement's prospects of expanding further.
Associate Professor, SUNY Buffalo Law School; Director, Canada-U.S. Legal Studies Centre.
The author can be reached at mlewis5@buffalo.edu.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the early 1990s if not earlier, voices within Asia have been
calling for various forms of deeper Asian integration. In the international
economic context, numerous competing visions have been proffered over
the years as to what form that integration should take, and which country or
countries should lead that process. Although the concepts have varied, for
close to twenty years, Asian economic integration models all excluded the
United States. One of the earliest such visions was proffered in 1991 by the
Malaysian Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad, who proposed an East Asia
Economic Group ("EAEG") comprising the members of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations ("ASEAN"), Japan, China and South Korea.' This
concept, among other developments, led U.S. Secretary of State James
Baker to warn that the U.S. needed to be careful not to be on the wrong side
of a divided Pacific. A few years later, the goal of eventually achieving a
Free Trade Agreement of the Asia-Pacific, or FTAAP, was elaborated
2
within APEC. While there was little agreement as to the way to
accomplish deeper international economic integration, there was broad
buy-in of the FTAAP concept. One formulation was for the FTAAP to
develop through the leadership of APEC; another path, proposed by China,
was for itself, Japan and Korea to form a Northeast Asian Free Trade
Agreement which would serve as the driver. China also suggested using
Mahathir's EAEG country grouping to create an East Asia-wide free trade
agreement comprising the ASEAN countries, China, Japan and Korea -
the so-called ASEAN+3; and a variant on this was an ASEAN+6
agreement, adding India, Australia and New Zealand to the ASEAN+3
countries. 3 Nonetheless, the various economic integration models were
primarily in conceptual form, without negotiations or other formal
movement towards deeper integration.4 Recently, however, a new dynamic
has developed.
The Trans-Pacific Partnership, itself an outgrowth of the Trans-Pacific
Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (also known as the P4
Agreement) between Brunei, Chile, New Zealand and Singapore, has
' See, e.g., Mahathir Mahamad, Let Asians Build Their Own Future Regionalism, I GLOBAL AsIA
13 (2006), http://globalasia.org/pdflissuel/MahathirGAll.pdf. At that time, ASEAN comprised
its original five members - Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand - as
well as Brunei, which joined in 1984.
2 See, e.g., Pathways to FTAAP, APEC (Nov. 14, 2010), http://www.apec.org/Meeting-
Papers/Leaders-Declarations/2010/20109aelm/pathways-to-ftaap.aspx.
Four other countries - Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam - joined ASEAN between
1995 and 1999. Thus the discussions of ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+6 began when ASEAN consisted
of its current ten members.
4 See, e.g., Masahiro Kawai & Ganeshan Wignaraja, ASEAN+3 or ASEAN+6: Which Way Forward?
presented at WTO/HEI Conference on Multilateralising Regionalism (Sept. 10-12, 2007), http://
www.wto.org/english/tratope/region e/con sep07 e/ kawai wignaraja e.pdf.
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emerged as a new contender to expand into an FTAAP, and unlike any
previous models, the TPP does include the United States, but at present
does not include China. In turn, the momentum of the TPP appears to have
spurred China to push more actively for its own multiparty grouping, the
ASEAN+6, currently known as the Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership ("RCEP"). Now that the first round of RCEP negotiations has
concluded, and the 18th round of TPP negotiations are underway, it seems
timely to analyze and assess these two models for deeper Asian economic
integration, and to consider whether one or the other of the models appears
to have more potential to further develop into an FTAAP.
The RCEP and TPP have each evolved conceptually over time, and this
evolution is important to understanding the directions each agreement may
take going forward. Thus Part II of this article briefly describes the origins
of each agreement. One or the other of these two models may be more
appealing to participants and potential participants. Part III considers
characteristics of the RCEP and the TPP that may have affected countries'
decisions to join one or both of these agreements, and analyzes the
prospects for each agreement to attract additional members going forward.
Finally, in Part IV the article discusses several recent developments that
could have an impact on the future expansion of the RCEP and/or the TPP.
In this Part, I argue that each of these developments appears likely to
enhance the likelihood the TPP will conclude successfully and ultimately
expand further, while having either a neutral or negative impact on the
RCEP.
II. AGREEMENT ORIGINS
The genesis of both the RCEP and the TPP lies in discussions held
within APEC, dating back nearly twenty years, reflecting a desire for
deeper economic integration within the Asia-Pacific region. In 1994, the
APEC membership held its annual meeting in Bogor, Indonesia and
adopted the Bogor Goals, which included the objective of achieving free
and open trade and investment amongst developed APEC members by
2010, and developing country members by 2020.6 Although this Bogor
Goal has yet to be fully realized, APEC has continued to strive towards this
objective. And consistent with the desire for free trade within APEC, in
2006 APEC announced a study into the prospect of a Free Trade
Agreement of the Asia-Pacific ("FTAAP"), with later pronouncements
endorsing an FTAAP as a goal.7 Differing visions for achieving an FTAAP
s As of time of writing (late July 2013).
6 See Assessment of Achievements of the Bogor Goals, APEC, http://www.apec.org/About-
Us/About-APEC/Achievements-and-Benefits/Bogor-Goals.aspx (last visited Aug. 8, 2013).
See Pathways to FTAAP, supra note 2.
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have led to two somewhat similar yet largely distinct agreements under
negotiation today. This Part discusses the origins of the RCEP and the TPP
in order to put the current agreement visions into their historical context.
1. The RCEP
The RCEP is being negotiated by the ten members of ASEAN (Brunei,
Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines,
Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam) plus Australia, China, India, Japan, New
Zealand and South Korea. While ASEAN is negotiating as a bloc, for most
of its history it has not been a free trade agreement, but rather a looser
alliance based on economic and political cooperation. In 2003, it
announced its intentions to form an ASEAN Community, and in 2007 this
intention was memorialized in writing with plans to form the Community
by 2015. One of the three pillars of the Community is the ASEAN
Economic Community, envisioned as a free trade agreement.8
Amongst the models that have been bandied about over the years for
achieving an FTAAP, two have included ASEAN at its hub. These have
colloquially been referred to as ASEAN+3 (the ASEAN countries plus
China, Japan and Korea), and ASEAN+6 (the ASEAN+3 countries plus
Australia, India and New Zealand - i.e., the RCEP participants). The
decision to pursue an ASEAN+6 rather than an ASEAN+3 strategy likely
arose in part from the desire of Japan to dilute China's dominance within
the alliance. It is also likely that at least some of the ASEAN countries
were also in favor of bringing in additional large economies. However, this
choice was not guaranteed. Former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir has
argued provocatively in the past that it would be inappropriate for New
Zealand and Australia to be a part of the alliance:
They belong to Australasia or Oceania. But, more
importantly, their people are largely ethnic Europeans; they are
culturally European and are ethnic Europeans in their worldview,
sympathies and political affiliations. The two countries have
always been quick to respond to political developments, and
even the wars, of the ethnic Europeans. In fact, Australia
considers itself the deputy-sheriff of the ethnically European
United States.
The overbearing attitude of ethnic Europeans is reflected in
the moral high ground that Australia takes. This contrasts with
the avoidance of preaching on the part of even the most powerful
Asian countries. For all these reasons, Australia and New
8 See OVERVIEw, http://www.asean.org/asean/about-asean/overview (last visited Aug. 8, 2013).
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Zealand cannot be regarded as Asians and cannot be members of
the East Asian grouping.
Whether or not, and in what contexts, New Zealand and Australia
should be considered a part of Asia are matters for debate. However,
ASEAN already has a "plus one" agreement with Australia and New
Zealand, so from the ASEAN perspective it was not problematic to include
these countries in the RCEP. Indeed, ASEAN formed separate study groups
in 2007 to consider the merits of forming an ASEAN+6 free trade
agreement as well as to form a less ambitious ASEAN+3 FTA.10 In any
case, despite any original preferences on the part of certain of the
participants to limit the grouping to ASEAN+3, Australia and New Zealand
(as well as India) have been included, and Australia is even slated to host
the second round of negotiations, scheduled for September 2013.11
2. The TPP
The TPP is an FTA currently being negotiated by twelve countries
(Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malasia, Mexico, New Zealand,
Peru, Singapore, the United States, Vietnam). The TPP has been called a
"twenty-first century trade agreement" by the United States Trade
Representative and others.14 The TPP is viewed as a novel agreement
both because of the geographic diversity of its members and due to its
ambitious coverage. The proposed agreement has its roots in the P4
Agreement comprising Brunei, Chile, New Zealand and Singapore, formed
15in 2005. The P4 was a highly unusual agreement, featuring countries with
no geographic link and little in the way of potential trade gains. What
brought the countries together was a shared desire to form a high-standards,
9 Mahamad, supra note 1, at 15.
1o See, e.g., Mun-Heng Toh, ASEAN+ 6 as a Step Towards an Asian Economic Community, EAST
ASIA FORUM (May 15, 2009), http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/05/15/asean6-as-a-step-towards-
an-asian-economic-community/.
" See Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) Joint Statement the First Meeting
of Trade Negotiating Committee, ASEAN (May 10, 2013) [hereinafter RCEP Joint Statement],
http://www.asean.org/news/asean-statement-communiques/item/regional-comprehensive-
economic-partnership-rcep-joint-statement-the-first-meeting-of-trade-negotiating-committee.
12 Japan joined the negotiations in July 2013, participating in the final days of the 18th round of
negotiations.
13 See, e.g., The United States in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, USTR (Nov., 2011),
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/20 11/november/united-states-trans-pacific-
partnership.
14 This has led scholars to consider the question "what is a twenty-first century trade agreement?"
See generally C.L. LIM ET AL, THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP: A QUEST FOR A TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY TRADE AGREEMENT (2012).
" See Chris Dalby, Joining TPP Best Answer for Worries of Further US Encirclement, GLOBAL
TIMES (Apr. 8, 2013), http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/773436.shtml#.Ud8Pn2IljnE.
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comprehensive agreement that would serve as the model for an ultimate
Free Trade Agreement of the Asia Pacific ("FTAAP").16 Towards this
end, the P4 does not provide for any goods market access exclusions
and has an open accession provision to encourage other like-minded
countries to seek to join and expand the agreement. " The P4 text
provided that two years after coming into force, the parties would
further negotiate agreements on investment and financial services.
When these negotiations were about to begin, the United States
indicated its interest in sitting in, signaling that if it liked what it saw, it
would seek to join the agreement. This immediately led to Australia and
Peru expressing interest, as well as Malaysia and Vietnam. Procedurally,
the decision was made, likely at the insistence of the United States, to
form a new agreement rather than to enlarge the TPP. "
III. TiE TPP AND RCEP: POINTS OF SIMILARITY AND
DIFFERENCE
As described above, both the RCEP and the TPP have grown out of
aspirations to create an FTAAP. It is thus unsurprising that these two
multiparty negotiations have a number of similarities; however, they also
feature some important differences. In this section, I will focus on some of
these similarities and differences, examining the agreements' membership,
ambition, and potential to attract additional participants.
A. Membership
The TPP features twelve negotiating parties and the RCEP, sixteen
parties. The two groupings have seven countries in common: Australia,
Brunei, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and Vietnam. This may
lead some to wonder why both of these agreements are needed. In addition,
within the RCEP, ASEAN already has +1 agreements with each of the
other negotiating partners, although there are many fewer linkages amongst
the +1 countries. Similarly within the TPP, there are many existing FTAs
amongst the participants. In fact, prior to the recent entry of Mexico,
16 The P4 negotiations were launched by Chile, New Zealand and Singapore at the 2002 APEC
Leaders' Summit. Brunei attended early rounds of the negotiations as an observer, but ultimately
joined as a founding member. See Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (P4) Agreement,
July 18, 2005, http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Trade-and-Economic-Relations/2-Trade-Relationships-and
-Agreements/Trans-Pacific/2-P4.php.
17 See Meredith Kolsky Lewis, Expanding the P-4 Trade Agreement into a Broader Trans-Pacific
Partnership: Implications, Risks and Opportunities, 4(2) AsIAN J. WTO & INT'L HEALTH L. & POL.
401, 405-06 (2009).
18 See Meredith Kolsky Lewis, The Trans-Pacific Partnership: New Paradigm or Wolf in Sheep's
Clothing?, 34 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 27, 33-34 (2011).
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Canada and now Japan, there were only eight bilateral combinations of the
participants that were not already covered by an FTA. Thus the agreements
share a significant membership overlap, and both will create another layer
of linkages amongst countries that are in many instances already partnered
in other agreements. Perhaps the most extreme example of this is New
Zealand and Singapore, which are already linked via the New Zealand-
Singapore FTA; the P4 Agreement; and the ASEAN-Australia-New
Zealand FTA. Should the RCEP and TPP both be concluded, there would
therefore be five different FTAs joining these two countries.
While the TPP and RCEP have multiple members in common, there
are important differences in the agreements' composition. First, the RCEP
is, as its name suggests, regional in nature. All of the participating countries
border (or in the case of island nations, are most closely adjacent to) one or
more other RCEP countries. In contrast, the TPP participants are more
geographically diverse, including multiple participants from North and
South America as well as the Southeast Asian, Northeast Asian, and
Oceania participants. These differences can be traced back to the
agreements' origins, with ASEAN beginning as a grouping of five
neighboring countries, 19 and the TPP stemming from the P4, which
comprises the geographically disparate Brunei, Chile, New Zealand and
Singapore.
A second important difference is the power base in the agreements.
The RCEP negotiations are just beginning, so it is unclear which parties
will emerge as the term-setters. ASEAN may think it is the driver, as it has
formed "+1" agreements with all the other participants and as such is the
notional hub. On the other hand, China may also try to play a leadership
role. Indeed, five of the six "+6" participants (Australia, China, India, Japan
and Korea) have higher GDPs than does any member of ASEAN.20 It is
perhaps telling that the name for this negotiation has changed from one that
highlights ASEAN ("ASEAN+6") to one that does not ("Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership"). Regardless of whether it takes the
helm of the negotiations, China is undeniably the most powerful member of
the group, both economically and politically.
Within the TPP, the clear agenda-setter is the United States. With the
world's highest GDP (through 2011), the United States economy dwarfed
that of the other participants until the recent entry of Japan, whose GDP is
still only about 40% of that of the U.S. 2 1 And with Japan joining the
19 ASEAN was founded in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.
Brunei joined in 1984, and in the 1990s, membership expanded to include Cambodia, Laos,
Myanmar and Vietnam. See generally ASEAN, http://www.asean.org (last visited Aug. 8, 2013).
20 See GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT RANKING TABLE, http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/GDP-
ranking-table (last visited Aug. 8, 2013).
21 id.
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negotiations at such a late date, with seventeen rounds already completed, it
is unlikely to significantly alter the overall course of the talks.
B. Ambition
While both the RCEP and TPP have been conceptualized with the goal
of an FTAAP in the background, the objectives for the substance of each
agreement are rather different, with the TPP being, on the whole,
considerably more ambitious than the RCEP.22
1. The TPP
The TPP negotiations began with the P4 vision in mind, with the
participants agreeing in principle to no per se exclusions. However, the
TPP parties are also negotiating over a variety of nontariff-related
commitments that are not a part of the P4, such as disciplines on regulatory
coherence, state-owned enterprises, and heightened intellectual property
protections. In addition, its binding dispute settlement mechanism will
apply to labor and environmental commitments. Although the TPP has
diverged from the P4's approach, it shares the P4 objective of serving as an
agreement that will be expanded into an ultimate FTAAP.
It remains to be seen to what extent the TPP will live up to its "high-
standards twenty-first century agreement" ambitions. Several years into the
negotiations, many uncertainties remain with respect to the agreement's
coverage. Notwithstanding the original vision of high standards and no
exclusions, agricultural interest groups in the United States would like to
see exclusions for dairy and sugar; Canada wishes to protect its dairy and
poultry supply management systems; 23 and Japan likely will seek to
exclude rice. At the same time, other participants, including Chile,
Malaysia, New Zealand and Vietnam, are reluctant to agree to TRIPS-plus
intellectual property disciplines among other provisions.24 This reluctance
will be heightened if there are to be market access exclusions or
impediments.
In particular, New Zealand's main economic interest in the TPP is the
potential for expanded access to the United States market for its dairy
products. While New Zealand might ultimately be willing to trade off
higher intellectual property standards in exchange for such market access,
22 Murray Hiebert & Liam Hanlon, ASEAN and Partners Launch Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INT'L STUDIES (Dec. 7, 2012), http://csis.org
/publication/asean-and-partners-launch-regional-comprehensive-economic-partnership.
23 See Jamie Strawbridge, Canada Faces Hurdle to TPP Participation over Dairy, Poultry Access,
28(15) INSIDE US TRADE (Apr. 16,2010).
24 See, e.g., TPP Members Float Pharmaceutical Ideas; US. Tables "Short-Supply" List, 31(21)
INSIDE US TRADE(May 24, 2013).
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if dairy were to be excluded from the TPP, New Zealand would struggle to
find enough value in the agreement to remain a participant. Similarly,
Vietnam's biggest potential market access gain lies in increased textile
exports to the United States. If, as has been rumored, the U.S. insists on a
"yam forward" rule of origin for TPP textiles and clothing exports, 25
Vietnam may not see the benefit in agreeing to provisions it dislikes
without getting anything of benefit in exchange.
2. The RCEP
A joint statement released by the RCEP participants following their
first round of negotiations suggests a desire for a more ambitious
agreement than the various ASEAN+1 agreements. The parties expressed
the objective of forming "a modem, comprehensive, high-quality and
mutually beneficial economic partnership agreement establishing an open
trade and investment environment in the region" that "will have broader
and deeper engagement with significant improvements over the existing
ASEAN+1 FTAs". 26
Notwithstanding the above language, it seems almost a certainty that
the RCEP will not be particularly notable in terms of its comprehensiveness.
ASEAN's agreements have generally been viewed as rather shallow, and
indeed ASEAN has yet to fully implement its own internal free trade
agreement. While certain participants such as Singapore, New Zealand and
to some extent Australia would favour a high-standards agreement, the
reality is that most of the participants, including China, Japan and India,
have primarily formed FTAs with exclusions and relatively lower
ambitions. It is difficult to imagine, therefore, that RCEP will be as
inclusive as the TPP in terms of market access.27
In addition, the RCEP participants will likely follow a different path
from the TPP on nonmarket access issues such as intellectual property,
environment, and labour. While these are high priorities of the United
States, and thus significant negotiating issues within the TPP, none of the
RCEP participants is likely to push for TRIPs-plus IP protections or for
making binding any significant environmental or labour commitments.
25 See id
26 RCEP Joint Statement, supra notel 1.
27 See Asian Free-Trade Bloc Aims to Be World's Biggest, ASAHI SHIMBUN (Aug. 31, 2012),
http://ajw.asahi.com/article/economy/business/AJ201208310078 ("Given the diversity of
economies involved, participants aim to agree initially on less liberalization than in the
forthcoming Trans-Pacific Partnership, which includes the United States."). For a discussion of the
difficulties that may lie ahead in negotiating the RCEP, see Peter Drysdale, A Breakthrough for
Asian Integration?, EAST ASIA FORUM (June 24, 2013), http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/06/24/
a-breakthrough-for-asian-integration/.
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Like the TPP, it seems that the RCEP is being negotiated with the
possibility in mind that it could be expanded into an FTAAP; early reports
indicate that, like the TPP and the P4 before it, the RCEP will be open for
additional parties to join, subject to the agreement of the existing parties.
C. Potential to Attract New Participants
An important factor in determining which of the TPP and RCEP has
the better possibility of deepening Asian economic integration is the
potential of each to expand beyond the current set of negotiating partners.
The TPP already has received expressions of interest in joining from a
number of additional countries, including the Philippines, Thailand and
28Costa Rica, among others. More intriguingly, as is discussed below, is the
fact that China has recently indicated potential interest. However, now that
the TPP has been under negotiation for a number of years, it seems likely
that the current group of twelve will hold off on including any new
members until the agreement is concluded in the first instance (although
one could envision Korea being incorporated earlier, should it decide to
seek to join, as it has already negotiated many of the relevant issues via
the KORUS FTA (Korea-U.S. FTA). It does seem though, based on the
countries queuing up as of now, that the TPP is likely, in the future, to
expand further. Japan's decision to join the negotiations is likely to
increase the interest in the TPP.
The RCEP is, at present, geographically limited to countries in Asia
and Oceania. It remains to be seen how attractive this avowedly regional
agreement will be to countries from outside the region. The RCEP may be
more attractive to some countries than the TPP, for two reasons. First, the
RCEP's lower level of ambition may be more appealing to developing
countries that do not wish to commit to TRIPS-plus IP protections, bindin
environmental and labour standards, and other features of the TPP.
Second, the RCEP includes the three largest economies in East Asia,
whereas the TPP has only Japan. Thus for countries seeking to expand their
connections in Asia, the RCEP may provide a bigger payoff in a single
negotiation than would the TPP. On the flip side of course, the TPP has the
United States, which some countries may consider a bigger draw than the
trifecta of China, Japan and Korea.
Of course there is nothing to stop countries from seeking to join both
the TPP and the RCEP, and several countries in ASEAN seem inclined to
do so by seeking to join the TPP. But particularly for countries with limited
28 See Indonesia Ponders TPP Membership, ASEAN BUSINESS NEWS (May 8, 2013),
http://www.aseanbriefing.com/news/2013/05/08/indonesia-ponders-tpp-membership.html.
29 See Hiebert & Hanlon, supra note 22.
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human and financial resources for negotiations and those outside the Asia-
Pacific, it will probably be the case that countries will seek to join one or
the other rather than both.
IV. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: SIGNS OF MOMENTUM FOR THE
TPP?
There have been a number of recent developments of interest that may
have implications for the momentum of the RCEP and TPP, and the future
potential of one or the other to expand into an FTAAP. These include the
announcement of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership;
Japan's entry into the TPP; China's statement that it is giving serious
consideration to the TPP; and USTR's signal that it will soon seek Trade
Promotion Authority. As will be discussed below, all of these
developments suggest momentum for the TPP rather than the RCEP.
A. TTIP
In February 2013, the United States and the European Union
announced plans to take the necessary domestic measures to permit them to
commence negotiations to form the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership, or TTIP. The TTIP would become the largest bilateral FTA
and would combine approximately 50% of world GDP. While the TT[P
has only recently been announced as a plan, it is nonetheless significant for
the Asia-Pacific region. To the extent that would-be participants (and dual
participants) are wondering whether their commitments made in the TPP or
the RCEP would be more likely to become multilateralized, (de jure
through the WTO process or defacto through additional FTA proliferation),
the TTIP would suggest the answer to that question is the TPP. Presumably
the United States would, in TTIP negotiations, seek to import in as many
commonalities as possible with the TPP in order to create common rules
across even more countries. If the EU and the TPP countries all take a
common approach to an issue - for example, state-owned enterprises -
then that has a better chance of becoming the global approach than
anything developed within the RCEP. At the same time, the understanding
that the U.S. will be seeking to include TPP-consistent provisions into the
TTIP may well make countries participating in both the RCEP and TPP
more intent on fighting for the terms they want in the TPP. This could
result in more protracted TPP negotiations, but it also creates an incentive
to conclude the agreement soon. If the EU were to push the U.S. in the
30 See European Union and United States to Launch Negotiations for a Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Feb. 13, 2013), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib
/press/index.cfm?id=869.
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TTIP towards a position the TPP participants didn't like, that situation
would be more dangerous the farther from completion the TPP was at the
time. Once terms are locked in via the TPP, however, it would seem
unlikely the U.S. would pursue a contradictory approach in the TTIP.
Even if the TTIP and TPP negotiations have no impact on the
substance of the provisions being pursued, the TPP participants may
well have concerns that the United States will switch its energies
towards the TTIP and away from the TPP, as it is challenging to
negotiate two huge agreements at the same time.3 Thus for one or more
reasons, the announcement of the TTIP may help keep TPP participants
focused on pushing towards the end game.
The TTIP is unlikely to have any direct impact on the RCEP
negotiations. However, to the extent the RCEP and the TPP each seek to
expand beyond their current membership and are vying to grow into an
FTAAP, the TTIP would seem to enhance the TPP's prospects relative to
the RCEP.
B. Japan's Entry into the TPP
Without Japan in the TPP, the prospects of the agreement expanding
into an FTAAP would be limited. No matter how many other, smaller
participants, an agreement without any of the three major East Asian
economies - China, Japan or Korea - cannot be considered a region-
wide agreement. Prior to Japan's entry, the U.S. dwarfed the other
participants in size, and only the countries without current FTAs with the
U.S. had much to gain in terms of market access and other trade expansion
opportunities. Japan's entry is a game-changer. 32 First, it adds another large
economy, giving the claim towards an ultimate FTAAP more credibility.
Second, it makes it more likely that Korea will elect to join the agreement.
And third, given Japan's perpetually unstable governments, it creates an
impetus to get the agreement concluded sooner rather than later. This may
seem counterintuitive, as Japan is seen as likely to raise objections to no
market access exclusions and to otherwise complicate the negotiations.
However, if the current Japanese government wants to reach a deal -
which it seems to - it has an incentive to agree to terms quickly before its
31 See, e.g., Claude Barfield, The G8's Exercise in Nostalgia, THE AMERICAN (June 25, 2013, 3:00
AM), http://www.american.com/archive/2013/june/the-g8s-exercise-in-nostalgia (expressing
skepticism over the Obama administration's choice to pursue both negotiations simultaneously:
"My reservations stem from disagreement with the priorities espoused by the Obama
administration for its suddenly overburdened trade agenda: specifically, implicitly giving equal
resources and attention to the TTIP and the strategically and, ultimately, economically more
important Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).").
32 See, e.g., Claude Barfield, Is Japan Joining the TPP a Game Changer?, AEI IDEAS (Mar. 15,
2013, 4:02 PM), http://www.aei-ideas.org/2013/03/japan-joins-the-tpp-gamechanger/.
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government falls and the tenuous political will to participate is lost. Other
TPP participants likewise have an incentive to move the ball forward
before Japan can slip back out of the negotiations.
As with the TTIP, Japan's joining the TPP is unlikely to have a direct
effect on the RCEP negotiations, but it again will enhance the TPP's
momentum towards completion as well as making the agreement more
attractive to would-be entrants.
C. China's Statement of Interest in the TPP
Much to the surprise of most observers, at the end of May 2013, a
Chinese Commerce Ministry spokesman posted a statement to the
Ministry's website stating: "We will analyze the advantages, disadvantages
and the possibility of joining the TPP, based on careful research and
according to principles of equality and mutual benefit".3 3 This statement
was unexpected for a number of reasons. First, China has reacted with
caution to the TPP over the past few years of its negotiation, wondering
whether its design is to exclude and disadvantage China. Second, it has
seemed improbable that China would seek to join a club whose rules have
been established largely by the United States; it seemed more logical that
China would seek its own path - a battle of equals, as it were - which it
has been doing via the RCEP.
But how likely is it that China will actually pursue joining? In the past,
certain U.S. officials made it known that they viewed the TPP as an
opportunity to form an agreement that would not include China. Other TPP
partners reacted quickly, however, indicating that the TPP was not anti-
China and that they did not ascribe to those views. More recently, in
November 2012, then-U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton
expressed openness toward China's joining, stating: "We welcome the
interest of any nation willing to meet the 21st century standards of the
TPP - including China". 34 Thus on the surface, there is no stated objection
on the table to China's seeking to join. However, how open the U.S. would
be in practice would remain to be seen. China itself may not be serious
about considering joining. In addition to the reasons stated above, there are
understandable reasons why China would not be interested. First, given the
late stage of the negotiations, it would seem unlikely China could
significantly alter the substantive structure and commitments currently
being negotiated. Second, there are many features of the TPP that would
seemingly be unappealing to China, including TRIPS-plus IP protections;
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binding labour and environmental provisions; and disciplines on state-
owned enterprises. Which raises the question, why did China say what it
did? One possibility is that the combination of the TTIP announcement and
Japan's entry into the TPP has led China to believe that the TPP is going to
be establishing the terms of the future, not the RCEP. Indeed, a researcher
from the Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic
Cooperation, which is under the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, recently
argued in the press that it would be in China's interests to participate in the
TPP:
China's active involvement in the TPP process would bring it
many challenges, but also opportunities. Excessive resistance to
the TPP will be detrimental to China and mean it will possibly
let slip chances to take advantage of the TPP to push for deeper
economic institutional reforms and promote the better and faster
development of its economy. TPP membership would bring
increased pressure on China to protect intellectual property rights
and make greater efforts to conserve energy and reduce
emissions. It would help China promote domestic innovations
and sharpen its global competitiveness to adapt to new
international trade and investment rules. At the same time,
participation in TPP talks at an early date would help China
avoid marginalization and gain a say in the making of its rules.
Relatedly, China may have been motivated in part by its current trade
clashes with the European Union. The troubled EU-China relationship may
give China concern that in TTIP negotiations, the EU would agree to TPP-
like terms, further isolating China from the rules of the future. Another
possibility is that China's statement, made only a few days before an
informal meeting to be held between President Obama and Chinese
president Xi Jinping, was designed to put pressure on the U.S. to either
welcome China's participation more forcefully or risk looking bad. But
perhaps China is sincere in its interest; the WTO accession process
provided the external pressure necessary to effect wide-ranging domestic
economic and legal reforms - and significant economic growth - within
China. The Chinese may now see a benefit in a new external driver, in the
form of the TPP. If China were to join the TPP, it would need to make
further legislative and policy changes relating to intellectual property and
investment, among other areas. These are changes that commentators have
noted China will need to make sooner or later, regardless of whether it
3 Zhile Wang, TPP Can Benefit China, CHINA DAiLY (June 24, 2013, 7:15 AM) http://usa.
chinadaily.com.cn/business/2013-06/24/content_16652502_2.htm.
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36becomes a party to the TPP. Indeed, more reports are emerging from
China suggesting that the May 2013 Ministry statement was more than a
trial balloon, with columnists increasingly arguing that the TPP would be
good for China.37
Regardless of China's motivations, or the likelihood anything will
come of China's statement, the statement should provide additional
incentive for the current participants to conclude the TPP negotiations. If
China is to seek to enter, it would be cleaner to have those negotiations
occur after the primary agreement has been signed by the current parties.
Trying to incorporate China in now would be extremely difficult to manage,
and would undoubtedly lead to a significant delay in concluding the
agreement. On the other hand, it would be difficult to reject an overture
from China if it seeks to join. Thus the current negotiating parties may
determine that the most prudent course of action would be to finish the
negotiations sooner rather than later.
China's statement may mean nothing. But if it does mean anything, it
would seem to signal strength for the TPP relative to the RCEP. If China
were to strive to enter the "competing" agreement, it would surely suggest
that China sees the future as lying with the TPP rather than the RCEP.
D. Trade Promotion Authority
In confirmation hearings in early June, President Obama's nominee for
the position of United States Trade Representative ("USTR") Michael
Froman, stated that the Administration intended to introduce legislation
soon that would, if passed, grant it Trade Promotion Authority ("TPA")."
This is a signal the Administration believes it can conclude the TPP
negotiations within the not-too-distant future. TPAis generally granted for a
fixed period of time, or it can also be granted to conclude a particular
agreement or agreements. Regardless of the form TPA takes, the fact that
the Administration will soon seek this authority is an indication it feels the
negotiations can and will conclude within a defined period of time. TPA is
an essential step in concluding a trade agreement with the United States. It
gives the Executive the authority to negotiate trade agreements, and then to
36 See Dalby, supra note 15.
3 See, e.g., Yangpeng Zheng, Debate on China's TPP Role Regains Momentum, CHINA DAILY
(July 11, 2013, 7:31 AM), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2013-07/ 11/content_16760355.htm.
38 Some are now suggesting that the United States should welcome such an overture. See, e.g.,
Donald Gross, Welcoming China to the Trans-Pacific Partnership, THE HUFFINGTON POST (July 9,
2013, 11:53 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/donald-gross/trans-pacific-partnership-china-b
3562801.html.
39 Doug Palmer, USTR Nominee Froman Promises Push for Trade Promotion Authority, REUTERS
(June 6, 2013), http://news.yahoo.com/ustr-nominee-froman-promises-push-trade-promotion-
authority-224330013.html.
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present such agreements to Congress for an up-or-down vote. This power
is critical, for without it, any trade deal put before Congress would be
subjected to cross-outs, additions, riders, and other changes being made to
the negotiated text. Thus as a practical matter, no FTA can be accepted
both by the trading partner and Congress unless the President has TPA.
TPA is also important because it indicates a "finish by" date will emerge.
The final horse-trading in a trade negotiation, when the difficult,
unresolved issues finally get addressed and previously "firm" positions
become malleable, tends to occur when there is a deadline by which the
deal must be concluded. TPA comes with an expiration date, and thus will
impose a practical deadline for the negotiations - and in so doing, spur
those difficult tradeoffs to finally be made.
If Congress does grant TPA to the Obama administration, it will make
it possible - and far more likely - for the TPP negotiations to conclude.
And if the TPP is in fact completed, it will trigger a wave of countries that
have wished to join but have thus far not been permitted to, to seek to
accede to the new agreement. TPA will not provide the same momentum to
the RCEP; instead, the seven participants in both negotiations will likely be
heavily occupied concluding the TPP (rather than negotiating the RCEP)
once TPA is granted.
V.CONCLUSION
The RCEP negotiations have only just begun, and the leaked
information from the TPP negotiations suggests that the agreement is far
from being concluded. Nonetheless, we have enough information to deduce
that these two multiparty arrangements offer alternate approaches towards
deepening economic integration in the Asia-Pacific region, whether more
narrowly or broadly defined. Even though the negotiations presently have
seven participants in common, their membership differs importantly with
respect to the presence of China in the RCEP but not the TPP, and the U.S.
in the TPP but not the RCEP. The more modest ambitions of the RCEP
may have appeal for some potential entrants, particularly developing
countries leery of committing to WTO-plus provisions. On the other hand,
recent developments including Japan's entry into the TPP and the
announcement of the TTIP suggest that the momentum is likely to lie more
with the TPP. However, much will depend on whether the Obama
administration succeeds in obtaining TPA from the U.S. Congress.
40 For a detailed study of TPR, see generally J.F. HORNBECK & WILLIAM H. COOPER, TRADE
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